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domestic cooking; whether this would be true under the
view taken in the Holt case is at least doubtful. But, as
pointed out by the New York court, the prevailing concepts
of policy lying back of the statutory implied warranty,
as well as the ordinary understanding of the buying public,
would call for a construction of the warranty most favor-
able to the buyer, especially perhaps in sales of food.
There would be no greater burden imposed upon the seller
in holding him responsible for the existence of harmful
parasites in meat sold by him than exists when he is held
responsible for the existence of harmful substances in
goods sold by him in the original package. As said by the
Court in the present case, quoting Cardozo, C. J., in Ryan
v. Progressive Grocery Stores:15 "The burden may be heavy.
It is one of the hazards of the business." The same rea-
sons of public policy which promote the imposition of lia-
bility without fault or knowledge in the latter case apply
with equal force to the former."
EMANCIPATION OF INFANT BY PARENT'S CRUELTY
FOR PURPOSES OF CONTROL OVER
EARNINGS AND SERVICES
Lucas, et ux., v. The Maryland Drydock Company'
The plaintiff's son, being eighteen years of age, obtained
a job at the Maryland Drydock Co. for wages of about forty
dollars a week. On his first pay day, the boy returned home
and found a note from his father directing him to leave
his pay on the desk and his father would see him later.
The boy left five dollars and fifty cents to reimburse his
father for car fare and lunch money and went to bed.
Between twelve-thirty and one in the morning the father
arrived home; and upon finding the note, he went up to the
boy's room, awakened him, and argued with the boy about
5255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931).
8 Perhaps with greater. It is stated in the expert testimony in the pres-
ent case that the packers could eliminate all danger of trichinosis by re-
frigerating all their pigs at about 5 degrees for about 21 days. This fact
Is commented upon by the Court in the McSpedon case, and seems to have
had considerable weight. For treatment of a different aspect of the problem
of warranty of food, see Note, The Doctrine of Implied Warranty Between
Restaurant-keeper and Guest (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 277.
131 A. (2d) 637 (1943).
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the money. Bodily blows ensued, during which, the boy
testified, his father choked him. In addition there was
general evidence to indicate that the father habitually
abused the boy, had a bad and violent temper, and once
choked the mother. The next day the boy moved to the
home of a cousin where he has since resided. Immedi-
ately thereafter, the father wrote to the defendants re-
questing them to terminate his son's employment and to
hold whatever earnings were due. Upon their refusal to
do so, suit was brought in the amount of five hundred dol-
lars for services rendered by the son. The Court in affirm-
ing the judgment of the lower court for the defendant
reasoned thusly: The right of a parent to the child's earn-
ings arises out of the duty to support the child. It is con-
tingent on the actual furnishing of such support, and hence
it is lost when the parent abandons the child, neglects or
refuses to maintain and support it, or forces it to leave
the home and labor for its own livelihood.2 A parent has
the right to exercise such control and restraint and to adopt
disciplinary measures for the child as will enable him to
discharge his parental duty. But the law protects infants
to the extent that if a parent exceeds the bounds of modera-
tion in chastising a child, the law will refuse to recognize
the parental right to services and earnings.3 In the instant
case, the son was emancipated by the intemperate and
brutal treatment of the father and was entitled to work
and collect his own pay.
The instant case suggests the problems of what is
emancipation, how does it occur, and what are the sequelae
of emancipation? Emancipation can be defined only in the
light of the common law status of minors. The common
law gave to the parent or person standing in loco parentis
the right to demand the services and earnings of the minor
in return for the support and care furnished by the parent.
The minor was under certain disabilities; to name a few:
he was not entitled to his own services and earnings, he
could not manage his own property, he could not establish
his own domicil, he could not sue or be sued in his own
name, and he could not enter into a valid binding contract.
Emancipation is then the conferring on the minor of one
or more of the incidents of being of age. It is the removal
of one or more of the disabilities of being a minor.
2 46 C. J. 1287.
8 39 Am. Jur. 601; 1 ScHoULFi, DoMESTic RELATIONS (6th Ed.) 783;
MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 410.
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Emancipation occurs in four principal ways: (1) By the
parent expressly or impliedly emancipating his child by a
written or oral agreement, or merely by some act denoting
a relinquishment of parental control. (2) By the miscon-
duct of the parent such as abandonment, cruelty, or neg-
lect. (3) By the marriage of the infant whether or not by
parental consent, so long as a valid marriage is entered
into. (4) By the mere passage of time such as when the
infant either reaches full majority (21 years), or reaches
an age when by statutory authority he is allowed to exer-
cise some of the rights of majority. In addition to the prin-
cipal methods outlined, it has been said that emancipation
also results during military service.4 And, in at least one
state, there is a provision for emancipation by civil pro-
ceeding if the minor can establish that he has reached an
age of discretion sufficient to justify release from parental
control.5
The question whether an emancipation has taken place
naturally arises whenever an infant attempts to exercise
a right usually accorded to adults, or whenever a parent
seeks to exercise an incident of control over a minor usu-
ally accorded to the parent. The question of emancipation
most often arises in a suit by the parent to recover for loss
of services and earnings of the minor occasioned by negli-
gence, seduction, etc. Until the instant case, which actually
had the problem squarely presented, the Maryland law on
the subject was only dicta.
In Mercer v. Walmsley,6 a father sued to recover for
the seduction of his daughter. The Court said:
"A father may maintain an action for debauching
his daughter when she was under age, whether she
was living with him at the time the offense was com-
mitted or not; for from the legal control he had over
her services, the law implies the relation of master and
servant, unless in the case of her not living with him,
he had, by some act of his own destroyed the relation."
The case of Keller v. Donnelly7 admitted the dictum in
Mercer v. Walmsley to be true; but actually decided that
in a case where the mother brought suit for seduction of
' On enlistment of a minor in military or naval service as emancipating
him, see annotation, 12 A. L. R. 927, noting Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 294 Ill. 106, 128 N. E. 289, 12 A. L. R. 924 (1920).
6 Louisiana Civil Code (Dart) Art. 385.
'5 H. & J. 27 (Md., 1820).
7 5 Md. 211 (1853).
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her daughter the prima facie presumption that she was
entitled to the child's services extended only 'until the
daughter was eighteen. The case of Greenwood v. Green-
wood 8 expressly adopted the dictum from Mercer v.
Walmsley as good law in deciding that a father could re-
cover for the seduction of his daughter when she was
under twenty-one, though living with an aunt.9
These cases are applicable to the present problem for
several reasons. The presumption of a master and servant
relation dovetails so perfectly with the common law time
period during which a minor was under full disability that
the presumption may be considered as simply a presump-
tion that the minor was not emancipated, and hence that
the parent is entitled to the daughter's services and earn-
ings. Moreover, the Court seems to recognize that emanci-
pation is part of the law of Maryland, when it speaks of
the father's being able to destroy the presumption of a
master and servant relation by an act of his own. And the
cases serve to illustrate the type of emancipation by com-
ing of age, in that the presumption of a master and servant
relation ceases when majority is reached. After that an
actual agency must be proved in order to recover, rather
than merely the relationship of parent and daughter.
Perhaps most important, the cases are based on the as-
sumption that the presumption of a master and servant
relation rests on the right of the parent to the services and
earnings of a minor daughter, so that we can conclude that
a sequel of emancipation of the daughter, by coming of
age or by an act of the parent, is a loss of control over
services and earnings unless the parent can prove an
agency in fact exists.
The emancipation of the first type is established by
authority in other jurisdictions. The Connecticut court in
Town of Plainville v. Town of Millford'° has said:
"Emancipation which occurs when a person once
under the power and control of another is rendered
free, ordinarily takes place when the child reaches
majority, but a minor child is emancipated if his par-
s 28 Md. 369 (1867).9 Query: Has Keller v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211 (1853), been overruled by
Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369 (1867)? In the latter case, the Court
construed the same statutes, relied on in the former for its result, as not
changing the common law rule that a father is entitled to the services of
his daughter until she is 21. No reason is apparent why there should be
any difference when the mother is the one bringing suit.
10119 Conn. 380, 177 A. 138 (1935).
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ents absolutely renounce by agreement or implication
all care and control of the child, or place the child in a
new relation inconsistent with the child's former rela-
tion as part of the parent's family."'1
It should be noted that category (1) includes the cases
in which a result of emancipation occurs because the par-
ent or person in loco parentis is estopped from disclaiming
emancipation. A type of equitable estoppel is worked out
by some courts in refusing to allow a parent to recover
for past services of a minor. If a parent acquiesces, whether
expressly or by deed, in his son's working and in allowing
the son to collect his own earnings, the parent is estopped
from recovering them from the employer if he has given
no notice to the employer not to pay directly to the son.12
In Lucas v. Maryland Drydock Co., the case here reviewed,
the father notified the employer to hold his son's earnings,
so that the principle of estoppel was precluded and eman-
cipation, if emancipation had occurred, would necessarily
be of another type.
Maryland has never had a case which involved emanci-
pation by marriage, of type (3).13 However, there is au-
thority in other jurisdictions to support the view that
emancipation may occur by marriage. 4 A Louisiana court,
in Bonnette v. Flourney,5 said: "A male or female is eman-
cipated by marriage." A Tennessee court explained the
matter more fully in Going v. Going,6 when it said: "The
11 On express emancipation by agreement or transfer of custody, see:
Schoenberg v. Voigt, 36 Mich. 310 (1877) ; In re Riff, 205 F. 406 (D. C.
Ark., 1913) ; Merithew v. Ellis, 116 Me. 468, 102 A. 301, 2 A. L. R. 1429
(1917). On implied emancipation inferred from circumstances, see: Lewis
v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 82 Kan. 351, 108 P. 95 (1910); Coleman v.
Dublin Coca Cola Co., 47 Ga. App. 369, 170 S. E. 549 (1933); Lipovac v.
Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 202 Iowa 517, 210 N. W. 573 (1926). Even though
the child remains at home, there can be implied emancipation, see: Done-
gan v. Davis, 66 Ala. 362 (1880) ; Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662,
271 N. W. 374 (1937).
11 On estoppel to deny emancipation although none exists, see: Giovagnlol
v. Ft. Orange Const. Co., 133 N. Y. S. 92 (1911); Daniel v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. Co., 171 N. C. 23, 86 S. E. 174 (1915); Schoonover v. Sparrow,
38 Minn. 393, 37 N. W. 949 (1888) ; Vance v. Calhoun, 77 Ark. 35, 90 S. W.
619 (1915).
18 Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 199 provides that a guardian shall de-
liver property to his female ward upon the marriage of the ward.
1, To the effect that marriage emancipates a child, see: Vanatta v. Carr,
229 Ill. 47, 82 N. E. 267 (1907) ; Easterly v. Cook, 140 Cal. App. 115, 35 P.
(2d) 164 (1934) ; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Shivers, 131 S. W. (2d) 677
(Tex. Civ. App., 1939) ; Ex parte Mosier, 114 Okla. 234, 245 P. 992 (1926);
Rinaldi v. Rnaldi, 94 N. J. Eq. 14, 118 A. 685 (1922).
189 La. App. 467, 119 So. 736 (1929).
188 Tenn. App. 690 (1928).
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marriage of a minor even without consent emancipates a
child from the custody of the parents, for the marriage
creates relations inconsistent with the subjection to the
control of the parent." But, the Montana court, in State v.
District Court adds:' 7 "Marriage does not change an in-
fant's status to that of an adult." It should be noted this
latter statement had to do with the effect and scope of
emancipation, which will be discussed later.
Emancipation by abandonment, cruelty, or neglect is
well illustrated by the principal case. It suffices to say that
this view finds support in other jurisdictions. 8
Emancipation by coming of age normally occurs when
a minor reaches the age of twenty-one. 9 In Maryland
there has been some confusion as to whether a female is
emancipated upon reaching eighteen. The confusion re-
sults from the existence of certain statutes20 conferring on
the females the powers to receive property by inheritance
at eighteen, to make a will, and to give receipts for prop-
erty; from which the Court has reasoned21 that the legis-
lature intended females to be considered as adults at
eighteen for some purposes. Needless to say such a conclu-
sion does not necessarily follow. A person may be eman-
cipated for one purpose but not for all purposes. Williston,
in his work on Contracts, was apparently confused by these
Maryland statutes enabling a female to perform some acts
before majority, and he stated that a female in Maryland
over eighteen but not over twenty-one was able to enter
into a valid binding contract.22
The sequelae of emancipation can be stated with less
definiteness than the factual situations resulting in emanci-
pation. Some courts speak of emancipation as a sudden
17 77 Mont. 290, 250 P. 973 (1926).
18 That misconduct of parent emancipates child, see: Nichols v. Harvey
and Hancock, 206 Ky. 112, 266 S. W. 870 (1924) ; Patek v. Plankinton Co.,
179 Wise. 442, 190 N. W. 920 (1922) ; Briscoe v. Price, 275 Ill. 63, 113 N. U3.
881 (1916) ; P. J. Hunnycutt and Co. v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E.
628, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 928 (1912).
19 That a child is emancipated at 21 although he continues to live at
home, see: Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930). But see
Brown v. Ramsey, 29 N. J. Law 117 (1860), that arrival at age of 21 is only
prima facie evidence of emancipation and may be overcome by showing
that the child is incompetent to care for himself.
20 Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 199, providing a guardian shall deliver
property to his ward upon (1) marriage if a female or (2) coming of age,
which is expressly stated as 18 for females. Ibid., Art. 79, Sees. 1, 7, 8,
10, allows females over 18 to execute valid receipts and releases. Ibid.,
Art. 93, Sec. 335, allows females over 18 to execute valid will.
21 Keller v. Donnelly, supra, n. 7.
221 WILLISTON, C01MACTS (both 1st Ed. 1920 and Rev. Ed. 1936) Sec.
224.
[VOL. VIII
1943] LUCAS v. MARYLAND DRYDOCK CO. 77
acquiring by the infant of majority in all its aspects. Still
others recognize that emancipation may remove one of the
disabilities of infancy and yet not remove all of them.23
The method of emancipation determines to a degree the
effects of the emancipation.24 Emancipation by mere pas-
sage of time, as when the infant reaches his majority, re-
moves all of the disabilities of infancy.25 But it does not
follow that the other methods of emancipation give a sim-
ilar result. Just because a parent abandons a child, the
child does not suddenly acquire power to enter into a valid,
binding contract. Rather, one must consider the method of
emancipation, and speculate as to what incidents of major-
ity should follow therefrom. Although some courts speak
broadly of an infant achieving the status of an adult, the
better view is the one expressed in Cohen v. Delaware,
L. and W. Railroad Co.,26 in saying: "Emancipation does not
remove all of an infant's disabilities."27
As was previously mentioned, Williston thought a fe-
male over eighteen and under twenty-one was able to enter
into a valid and binding contract in Maryland.2 1 Even more
generally speaking, the question arises does an emanci-
pated infant acquire the contractual ability of an adult
through emancipation? The answer is he does if he is
emancipated by reaching majority; but as regards other
types of emancipation, there is a conflict of authority. One
view is that he does, but one can question the soundness of
that view. Query: If an emancipated infant needs protec-
tion when he contracts for non-necessaries, does an infant
emancipated by desertion of his parents no longer need
such protection? The better view is expressed in Schoe-
ning v. Gallet:29
28 Complete emancipation does not sever parent and child relationship
for all purposes. See: Round Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W.
956 (1909) ; Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm., 294 Ill. 106, 128 N. E.
289, 12 A. L. R. 924 (1920) ; Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wisc. 662, 271
N. W. 374 (1936).
2 That marriage emancipates so as to allow a minor husband to sue in
his own name in an action to free his minor wife from the custody of her
family, see: In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 P. 159, 21 L. R. A., N. S., 847
(1909).
5But see eupra, n. 19.
26269 N. Y. S. 667 (1934).
27 Similarly, the Maryland Court has recognized that the statutes cited
supra, n. 20, entitle a female over 18 to possession of her property, but
they do not allow her to dispose of it except by devise. See: Davis v.
Jacquin, 5 H. & J. 109 (1820); Frldge v. State, 3 G. & J. 115 (1830);
Waring v. Waring, 2 B1. 674 (1830) ; Bowers v. State, 7 H. & J. 32 (1826);
Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 385 (1867).
,8 See suptra, n. 22.
" 206 Wlsc. 52, 238 N. W. 852 (1931).
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"Where the issue is whether a minor may rescind
contracts for the purchase of things not necessary, the
fact of the emancipation is immaterial."
Another problem is, how does emancipation affect the
parent's duty to support the child? Again there is a diver-
gence of authority. The correct answer as regards emanci-
pation by coming of age, in the strict sense, is that a parent
is relieved of the obligation to support. But as regards
other types of emancipation, a correct or sociably desirable
solution is not as easily obtained. In Going v. Going"0 the
Tennessee court said briefly:
"Emancipation of a child is the relinquishment by
the parent of control and authority over the child, con-
ferring on him the right to his earnings and terminat-
ing the parent's legal duty to support the child."
Does it seem fair to deprive all minors of support if
emancipated by the wrongful conduct of the parent?"' On
the other hand if the child is emancipated by marriage,
especially a female, is it desirable to retain the parents'
duty to support?
In conclusion, the instant case is interesting as recog-
nizing emancipation of the second type. Moreover, it sug-
gests some of the problems attendant on emancipation. It
may be said that a single concept of emancipation, as to
results, will not fit all situations. Rather each type of
emancipation and each problem involving emancipation
must be considered separately. A broad conceptualism
will not suffice. It is unwise to say simply an emancipated
infant is the same as an adult in the eyes of the law.
Rather the method of emancipation necessarily affects the
results to be obtained by the fact of emancipation.
80 See 8upra, n. 16.
31 That a parent is still under a duty to support, see: Johnson, et al., v.
Silsbee, 49 N. H. 543 (1870); Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W.
295, 7 L. R. A. 176 (1890); Simmonds v. Stewart, 198 Ky. 330, 248 S. W.
892 (1923) ; Hendrickson v. Town of Queen, 149 Minn. 79, 182 N. W. 952
(1921).
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